Abstract. An open-loop two-person zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ for short) stochastic differential game is considered. The controls for both players are allowed to appear in both the drift and diffusion of the state equation, the weighting matrices in the payoff/cost functional are not assumed to be definite/nonsingular, and the cross-terms between two controls are allowed to appear. A forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE, for short) and a generalized differential Riccati equation are introduced, whose solvability leads to the existence of the open-loop saddle points for the corresponding two-person zero-sum LQ stochastic differential game, under some additional mild conditions. The main idea is a thorough study of general two-person zero-sum LQ games in Hilbert spaces.
1. Introduction. Throughout this paper, we let (Ω, F, lF, lP) be a complete filtered probability space satisfying the usual condition ( [17] ), on which a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion W (·) is defined with lF ≡ {F t } t≥0 being its natural filtration augmented by all the lP-null sets in F. Let T > 0 and x ∈ lR n . Consider the following controlled linear stochastic differential equation (SDE, for short) on time interval [0, T ]:     
dX(t) = [A(t)X(t) + B 1 (t)u 1 (t) + B 2 (t)u 2 (t)]dt +[C(t)X(t) + D 1 (t)u 1 (t) + D 2 (t)u 2 (t)]dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ], X(0) = x.
(1.1)
In the above X(·), u 1 (·), and u 2 (·) are lF-adapted processes taking values in lR n , lR m 1 , and lR m 2 , respectively; and they represent the state and the controls of the two players, respectively. We assume that A(·), B 1 (·), B 2 (·), C(·), D 1 (·), and D 2 (·) are deterministic bounded matrix-valued functions of proper dimensions. Clearly, for any x ∈ lR n and proper processes u 1 (·) and u 2 (·) (see the next section), the state equation (1.1) admits a unique strong solution X(·) ≡ X(· ; x, u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) (which 94 LIBIN MOU AND JIONGMIN YONG is square integrable). Therefore, one can introduce a quadratic performance index (representing the payoff/cost): J x (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) = lE T s q(t, X(t), u 1 (t), u 2 (t))dt + GX(T ), X(T ) .
(1.2)
Here,
with Q(·), S i (·), and R ij (·) being deterministic bounded matrix-valued functions of suitable dimensions and G being a constant matrix. Roughly speaking, in the game, Player 1 (who takes control u 1 (·)) wishes to minimize (1.2), and Player 2 (who takes control u 2 (·)) wishes to maximize (1.2). Therefore, (1.2) represents the cost for Player 1 and the payoff for Player 2. There are basically two types of controls for both players: open-loop controls and closedloop controls. In this paper, we concentrate on the open-loop case. The closed-loop problem will be addressed in a forthcoming paper.
Let us now look at the case that both players use open-loop controls. Since both players are non-cooperative, they would like to seek their admissible controlsû 1 (·) andû 2 (·), respectively, such that J x (û 1 (·), u 2 (·)) ≤ J x (û 1 (·),û 2 (·)) ≤ J x (u 1 (·),û 2 (·)), (1.4) for all admissible controls u 1 (·) and u 2 (·) (see the next section for a precise definition). The reason is that when (1.4) holds, none of the players can improve his/her outcome J x (û 1 (·),û 2 (·)) by deviating fromû 1 (·) orû 2 (·) unilaterally. Thus, both players will be satisfied with the controlsû 1 (·) andû 2 (·), respectively. We refer to (û 1 n , the open-loop value function x → V (x) can be defined. On the other hand, by thinking about an optimal control problem (which can be regarded as a game with the dimension m 2 of the space that u 2 (t) takes values being 0), one immediately realizes that, in general, one should not expect to have the existence of an open-loop saddle point from the existence of the open-loop value function. We will return to this point later.
To roughly state our main results, let us introduce the following system of SDE, called forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE, for short):             
dX(t) = A(t)X(t) + B(t)u(t) dt + C(t)X(t) + D(t)u(t) dW (t), dY (t) = − Q(t)X(t) + A (t)Y (t) + C (t)Z(t) + S (t)u(t) dt + Z(t)dW (t),
(1.5) The unknown in the above is the triple of lF-adapted processes (X(·), Y (·), Z(·)). Note that the above is a coupled FBSDE with the coupling through u(·) and the last equality (see [19] , [25] ). We also introduce the following differential equation
where M † stands for the pseudo-inverse of matrix M (see [23] ), and
Note that the third condition in (1.6) is equivalent to the following range condition: 8) where R(M ) stands for the range of matrix M . For stochastic LQ problems, a similar Riccati differential equation was introduced in [1] in which D 1 = D, R 11 = R, and m 2 = 0 (thus, the last condition in (1.6) does not appear). The paper [20] discussed some basic properties of generalized Riccati equations arising in stochastic games.
Our main results of this paper can be informally described as follows. The existence of an open-loop saddle point of the game is equivalent to the solvability of FBSDE (1.5) plus the convexity and concavity of J x (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) in u 1 (·) and u 2 (·), respectively. Also, the solvability of (1.6) implies that of FBSDE (1.5). On the other hand, our LQ stochastic differential game can be approached by a leaderfollower fashion (see [24] ). Namely, for example, let u 1 (·) be taken to be the leader and u 2 (·) be taken to be the follower. Then for any fixed u 1 (·), we first maximize u 2 (·) → J x (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)). Suppose there exists an optimal controlû 2 (·) ≡û 2 (u 1 (·)) (depending on u 1 (·)). Then we minimize u 1 (·) → J x (u 1 (·),û 2 (u 1 (·))). Among other things, we show that if such a leader-follower problem admits an optimal solution, it must be an open-loop saddle point of our LQ stochastic differential game.
There is extensive literature on deterministic LQ differential games (i.e., C(·) = 0, D 1 (·) = 0, and D 2 (·) = 0) and stochastic LQ differential games with the diffusion term independent of the state and controls (see [13] , [16] , [3] , [4] , [9] , [15] , for examples). The case that the controls appear in the diffusion was considered in [24] under a leader-follower framework. For other related works, we mention [6] , [14] , [7] , [8] , and [12] .
Stochastic LQ control problems can be treated as zero-sum games with only one player. From this point, our results can be considered as generalizations of the relevant results in [10] , [16] , [1] , and [2] for LQ control problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present some preliminaries. In Section 3, a careful study of LQ games in Hilbert space is carried out. Section 4 is devoted to the main results of this paper.
2.
Preliminaries. In this section, we present some preliminaries. First of all, besides lR n , the n-dimensional Euclidean space, and lR n×m , the spaces of all (n×m) matrices, endowed with the inner product (M, N ) → tr [M N ], we let S n ⊆ lR n×n be the set of all (n × n) symmetric matrices. 
Before going further, we need the following standing assumptions which will be assumed in the rest of the paper.
In what follows, sometimes, we will denote
By a standard well-posedness theorem for linear stochastic differential equation (see [27] , Chapter 1, Theorem 6.14, for example), under (A1), for any x ∈ lR n and (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) ∈ U 1 × U 2 , state equation (1.1) has a unique strong solution 
n . The open-loop upper value of the game at x is defined by 5) and the open-loop lower value of the game at x is defined by
In the case that 
(2.8) We will see that the converse is not true in general; see Proposition 3.10.
3. LQ Games in Hilbert Spaces. We will see in the next section that our twoperson zero-sum LQ stochastic differential game can be transformed into a twoperson zero-sum LQ games in Hilbert spaces. Hence, in this section, we first look at LQ games in Hilbert spaces.
Let H be a Hilbert space and Θ : D(Θ) ⊆ H → H be a self-adjoint operator (By definition, it is densely defined and closed, but is not necessarily bounded). We denote R(Θ) and N (Θ) to be the range and kernel of Θ, respectively. Since Θ is self-
, we have the following representation for Θ:
where Θ :
is self-adjoint (again, it is densely defined and closed, but not necessarily bounded, on the Hilbert space R(Θ)). Now, we define the pseudo-inverse Θ † by the following:
with domain
From the above, we can easily seen the following facts:
(i) Θ † is (closed, densely defined, and) self-adjoint; R(Θ) is closed if and only if Θ † is bounded.
(ii) By the definition of Θ † (see (3.2)), together with (3.3), one has that
. Therefore, we have
Note that when Θ is bounded, Θ † Θ is already an orthogonal projection from
(iv) The map Θ → Θ † is not continuous (which can be seen even from onedimensional case). Now, let us consider a quadratic functional on H: 
if and only if
7) if and only if it is a solution of the following equation:
Θû + v = 0, (3.9) which is equivalent to the following:
(iii) When (3.7) holds, it is necessary that
Moreover,û is unique if and only if N (Θ) = {0}.
Proof. (i) For anyû ∈ D(Θ), on has
Hence, there exists aû ∈ D(Θ) such that (3.7) holds if and only if (3.9) holds, which gives (3.8) (and the first part of (ii)). Conversely, if (3.8) holds, then there exists aû ∈ D(Θ) such that (3.9) holds. Consequently,
(ii) We have proved the first part of (ii) (from (3.12)). The second part is straightforward.
(iii) For anyû ∈ D(Θ) satisfying (3.7), one must have (3.9). Hence,
14) which proves (3.11). Finally, by (3.9), we see thatû is unique if and only if N (Θ) = {0}.
Note that (3.9) is equivalent to the following:
Thus,û is actually a critical point of functional J(·). Thus, Proposition 3.1 characterizes the critical point(s) of the quadratic functional J(·). Equations (3.7) and (3.11) are completion of square for the functional J(·) (although Θ is not necessarily positive/negative semi-definite).
Next, for any self-adjoint operator Θ, regardless whether it is bounded or unbounded, we have the following spectrum decomposition ( [11] )
where σ(Θ) ⊆ lR is the spectrum of Θ, (which is a compact set if Θ is bounded, and unbounded if Θ is unbounded); and {P λ λ ∈ σ(Θ)} is a family of projection measures. In the case that
Now, we can consider minimization problem for functional J(·).
Proposition 3.2. Let Θ : D(Θ) ⊆ H → H be self-adjoint and v ∈ H. (i) The following holds: inf
if and only if (3.17) holds and
(ii) There exists aû ∈ H such that 
Then v n ∈ R(Θ), and
Hence, letting Hence, sufficiency follows. Finally, from the fact that
Thus, (3.21) follows.
(ii) By Proposition 3.1 (i), we know that (3.8) holds if and only if (3.7) holds for someû ∈ D(Θ). Then (3.17) holds if and only ifû is a minimum. The rest is clear.
The above result tells us that the existence of minimum is strictly stronger than the finiteness of the infimum of the functional J(·), which have been described by conditions (3.8) and (3.20) , respectively. Note here that R(Θ) ⊆ R(Θ The following example shows the necessity of condition (3.20) in a concrete way.
, where β ∈ (0, 1). Then Θ : H → H is bounded, self-adjoint, and positive definite (but not uniformly). Clearly, for any α ∈ lR,
Θu n with
Then by letting u n as above, we see that
This means that inf
An interesting point here is that positive semi-definiteness of Θ is not enough to ensure the finiteness of the infimum of J(·).
In the rest of this section, we let H = H 1 × H 2 with H 1 and H 2 being two Hilbert spaces, and consider a quadratic functional on H:
We assume that Θ ij :
Consider a two-person zero-sum game with the cost/payoff functional given by (3.24) . In the game, Player 1 takes u 1 ∈ H 1 to minimize J(u 1 , u 2 ) and Player 2 takes u 2 ∈ H 2 to maximize J(u 1 , u 2 ). Note that if we take H = H 1 (i.e., H 2 = {0}), then the game problem becomes the minimization problem for a quadratic functional in a Hilbert space. Hence, minimization/maximization problem(s) can be regarded as a special case of zero-sum games. The following result is a natural extension of Proposition 3.2,(ii). 25) if and only if (3.8) holds and the following are true:
In the above case, each saddle pointû = ( 
(3.27) This is a contradiction. Hence, Θ 11 ≥ 0 must be true. Similarly, Θ 22 ≤ 0 must hold.
Next, by (3.12) and (3.25), we have
28) for all u 2 ∈ H 2 . Hence, it is necessary that
Thus, (3.8) follows.
Hence, (3.25) follows. The rest of the proof is clear.
We have the following interesting corollary. exists and is bounded. Hence, Proposition 3.4 applies. By Proposition 3.2 (ii), we know that the above-mentioned conditions are equivalent to the unique existence of the minimizer and the maximizer of J(u 1 , 0) and J(0, u 2 ), respectively.
The above result tells us that for quadratic functionals, the existence of a unique saddle point is guaranteed by the existence of solutions to two optimization problems for quadratic functionals. But, the above result does not give a construction of the saddle point. The following result gives a construction of a saddle point. 
Then the game admits a saddle point given by the following:
(3.34)
(ii) Suppose the following holds:
(3.36) (iii) The saddle points given in (3.34) and (3.36) are the same if either 
One can approach the two-person zero-sum game in a leader-follower fashion. More precisely, suppose Player 2 is the leader and Player 1 is the follower. First, the follower minimizes his/her cost functional u 1 → J(u 1 , u 2 ) for any leader's control u 2 . Then the leader wants to maximizes his/her payoff functional J 2 (u 2 ) = inf u1∈H1 J(u 1 , u 2 ). One can reverse the role of Players 1 and 2. We refer to the above as a leader-follower game (or an iterative optimization problem). A natural question is whether we can obtain a saddle point of the original two-person zerosum game by solving a leader-follower game? The following result gives a positive answer, under certain conditions. Corollary 3.7. Let (3.26) hold.
(i) Suppose for any u 2 ∈ H 2 , there exists aū 1 (u 2 ) ∈ H 1 such that
and there exists aû 2 ∈ H 2 such that
is a saddle point of the game and (3.34) gives such a saddle point.
(ii) Suppose for any u 1 ∈ H 1 , there exists aū 2 (u 1 ) ∈ H 2 such that
and there exists aũ 1 ∈ H 1 such that
is a saddle point of the game and (3.36) gives such a saddle point.
(iii) The saddle points given in (3.34) and (3.36) are both
, which is a saddle point defined in both (i) and (ii).
Proof. We prove (i) and (iii) only. For any u 2 ∈ H 2 , let us consider the minimization problem for the functional u 1 → J(u 1 , u 2 ). Recall that and a minimizer is given byū
which satisfies Θ 11ū1 (u 2 ) + Θ 12 u 2 + v 1 = 0. Since u 2 is arbitrary,
Furthermore, we have
(3.49) Now, by Proposition 3.2 again, we see that there exists aû 2 that maximizes J 2 (·) if and only if
, and a maximizer is given bŷ
Note that the point 
This proves (iii).
We should point out that the conditions imposed in the above result are sufficient for the existence of a saddle point, and they are not necessary.
From Proposition 3.2 (i), we know that for a minimization problem (which is a special case of games), finiteness of the infimum of the functional does not necessarily imply the existence of a minimizer. In the general game case, we expect to have a similar situation. To be more precise, we introduce the upper value V + and the lower value V − of the game as follows:
In general, we have
52) regardless if V
+ and/or V − are finite or infinite. If both V ± are finite and they are equal, we say that the game has a value. It is easy to show that if J(u 1 , u 2 ) defined by (3.24) admits a saddle point (û 1 ,û 2 ), then
This means that the existence of a saddle point implies the existence of the value.
On the other hand, as we mentioned above, the existence of the value does not necessarily imply the existence of a saddle point. We will see a more delicate case a little later.
The following proposition collects some results on the upper and lower values for the game. 
We first show (3.26) by a contradiction argument. If Θ 11 ≥ 0 is not true, then Θ 11 u 1 , u 1 < 0, for some u 1 ∈ H 1 . Consequently, for any u 2 ∈ H 2 , we have that
This contradicts the finiteness of V − . Hence, Θ 11 ≥ 0 must be true. Similarly, by the finiteness of V + , Θ 22 ≤ 0 holds.
We want to show that v,û = 0. To this end, we note that Θ 12 = Θ * 21 . Hence, by (3.55), one has
Due to (3.26), we must have
Hence, it follows from (3.55) that
Consequently,
By the finiteness of V − , we can find someū 2 ∈ H 2 such that
Hence, we must have v 1 ,û 1 = 0. Similarly, one can obtain v 2 ,û 2 = 0. These imply v,û = 0, proving (iii).
Since an optimization problem is a special case of the game, by Proposition 3.2, we know that in the above proposition, (iii) does not necessarily imply (ii) (see Example 3.3 also). It is not clear if (i) and (ii) in the above proposition are equivalent. This amounts to asking if the finiteness of both upper and lower values necessarily implies the existence of the value. The following proposition gives some sufficient conditions under which V + , V − , or both are finite, respectively, under conditions which are weaker than those for the existence of a saddle point. 
57) then V
+ is finite and is given by
(ii) If the following holds:
59) then V
− is finite and is given by
(iii) If the following holds:
then both V + and V − are finite and given by (3.58) and (3.60), respectively. Moreover, if
62) then the game admits a value.
Proof. We prove (ii) first. Recall that
with the domain
According to Proposition 3.2, D(J 2 ) = φ if and only if
and D(J 2 ) is characterized by the following:
Moreover, for any u 2 ∈ D(J 2 ), one has 11 ), which is still weaker than the second condition in (3.59), then (3.67) becomes
which is a linear space (thus, it is always non-empty). Moreover, (3.68) becomes
Further, if the second condition in (3.59) (i.e., v 1 ∈ R(Θ 11 )) holds, then for any
11 ) , one has
is an unbounded operator with domain Θ −1 12 R(Θ 11 ) . Thus, by Proposition 3.2, J 2 (·) admits a finite supremum if and only the third and fourth conditions in (3.59) hold, and in this case, V − is given by (3.60). This proves (ii).
The proof of (i) is similar.
Finally, we prove (iii). Note that (3.61) implies (3.57) and (3.59). Hence, both V + and V − are finite. Consequently, the existence of the value is equivalent to the following:
(3.72) To show the above (under our conditions), we denote
(3.73) By (3.61), we know that
Hence,
Note that under (3.62), one has
Hence, the left hand side of (3.72) becomes
Note that
Therefore, restricted on R(Θ 11 ) ⊕ R(Θ 22 ), Λ is a unitary operator. Hence, (3.72) holds, proving the existence of the value.
We point out that conditions (3.61) and (3.62) do not necessarily imply either (3.33) or (3.35) . Note that, similar to Corollary 3.7, the above proposition also follows a leader-follower fashion. It seems that by being a follower, the player has some advantages. In the case that the value exists, roughly speaking, none of the players will have such an advantage by being a follower.
The above proposition does not completely answer the question if the finiteness of both upper and lower values implies the existence of the value. We conjecture that there is a case for which both upper and lower values are finite but they are not equal.
4.
Open-Loop LQ Games. In this section we discuss our LQ differential game with both players using open-loop controls. We will mainly apply the results from the previous section, together with some theory of BSDEs and FBSDEs ( [22] , [19] ; see also [24] ) to approach the open-loop game.
n×n )) be the solution of the following SDE:
Then, it is known that for any x ∈ lR n , and u(·) ≡ (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) ∈ U 1 × U 2 , the corresponding state process X(·) ≡ X(· ; x, u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) can be represented by
We also define B :
Clearly, both B and B are bounded linear operators, so are their adjoint operators
Having the above, we are now able to rewrite J x (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) as a bilinear form of (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) explicitly. To this end, we define
with Θ being self-adjoint. Then we have
Q(t)X(t), X(t) +2 S(t)X(t), u(t) + R(t)u(t), u(t) dt + GX(T ), X(T ) = lE
T 0
Q(t) A(t)x + B[u(·)](t) , A(t)x + B[u(·)](t) +2 S(t) A(t)x + B[u(·)](t) , u(t) + R(t)u(t), u(t) dt
(4.7) Hence, our open-loop LQ stochastic differential game problem becomes a game with quadratic cost/payoff functional (4.7) defined on the Hilbert space U 1 × U 2 . We let
Then the following result holds (by Proposition 3.4 from the previous section). and it admits the following representation: Note that when (4.9)-(4.10) hold, for any v(·) ∈ U 1 × U 2 ,û(·) given by (4.12) is a solution of (4.11), and therefore is a saddle point of the game.
We see that (4.9) is equivalent to the convexity of u 1 (·) → J 0 (u 1 (·), 0) and the concavity of u 2 (·) → J 0 (0, u 2 (·)), and (4.10) is equivalent to the solvability of equation (4.11) forû(·). These two conditions seem to be not very explicit. Hence, we would like to look at some other sufficient conditions guaranteeing them. To this end, let us first give a representation for B * and B * . Let us recall that
(Ω; lR n ), the following linear backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE, for short) admits a unique adapted solution (Y (·), Z(·)) ( [22] , [19] ):
We have the following result. 14) with (Y (·), Z(·)) being the adapted solution of (4.13) corresponding to η = 0 and h(·); and for any η ∈ L 15) with (Y (·), Z(·)) being the adapted solution of (4.13) corresponding to h(·) = 0 and η.
Proof. First of all, by [22] , BSDE (4.13) admits a unique adapted solution. Next,
. Then using Itô's formula, we have
d X(t), Y (t) = A(t)X(t) + B(t)u(t), Y (t) + X(t), −A (t)Y (t) −C (t)Z(t) − h(t) + C(t)X(t) + D(t)u(t), Z(t) dt + C(t)X(t) + D(t)u(t), Y (t) + X(t), Z(t) dW (t) = B (t)Y (t) + D (t)Z(t), u(t) − X(t), h(t) dt + C(t)X(t) + D(t)u(t), Y (t) + X(t), Z(t) dW (t).
Consequently, Thus, by the linearity of (4.13), we obtain (4.14) and (4.15) immediately.
The following result gives an equivalent condition for (4.10) (or the solvability of (4.11)). Proposition 4.3. Let (A1)-(A2) hold. For given x ∈ lR n , the following holds: In a similar nature, we have the following result concerning condition (4.9). Therefore, (4.23) follows.
S(t)X(t) + B (t)Y (t) + D (t)Z(t) + R(t)û(t)
We see that (4.18)-(4.19) gives a coupled FBSDE (the coupling is given through (4.19) ). For such an FBSDE, let us look at the solvability via the idea of FourStep Scheme ( [18] , [19] ). More precisely, let (X(·), Y (·), Z(·),û(·)) be lF-adapted satisfying (4.18)-(4.19), and suppose that one has the following relation: Now suppose the following range condition holds: This proves the following proposition.
R B (t)P (t) + D (t)P (t)C(t) + S(t) ⊆ R D (t)P (t)D(t) + R(t) , t

